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Abstract: This Paper looks at the different roles that multi-
stakeholder institutions play in the Internet governance
ecosystem. We propose a model for framing the discussion of
Internet governance within the context of the Internet's
layered model (infrastructure, logical, content and social
layers). To illustrate why this model is important, we use the
example of the negotiations in Dubai in 2012 at the World
Conference on International Telecommunications to show
how legal proposals can go awry if the institutions (e.g., the
ITU, ICANN, IETF, and the IGF) in the governance system
lose the grasp on their respective areas of expertise. Several
areas of conflict (a "tussle") are reviewed, such as the desire
to promote more broadband infrastructure, a topic that is in
the remit of the International Telecommunications Union
(ITU), but also the recurring desire of countries like Russia
and China to use the ITU to regulate content and restrict free
expression on the Internet through onerous cybersecurity
and spam provisions. We conclude that it is folly to try to
regulate all these areas through an international treaty, and
encourage further development of mechanisms for global
debate, deliberation and cooperation in policy development
at places like the Internet Governance Forum (IGF).
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I. INTRODUCTION
The Internet is a universal space that many expect to remain open,
free, and borderless. However, over the last several years more and
more governments and companies have been taking action to control
the flow of information over the Internet. One way they have
attempted to assert control is by claiming that two similar concepts-
the Internet and cloud computing-are somehow different, and that
the Internet and the "cloud" can be regulated separately and
independently "localized."' This line of thinking not only
misunderstands the technical functionality of the Internet, it proposes
to fundamentally change the governance structure that brought the
Internet to the world. 2 The most recent high-profile effort to change
the Internet's governance took place in December 2012 at the World
Conference on International Telecommunications (WCIT-12). 3 Many
feared that WCIT-12 would change the Internet for the worst-and
happily, that did not happen. In this Paper, we will look at the
experience of WCIT-12 together with the overall landscape of
governance institutions, and propose a model for thinking of
governance institutions that aligns with the Internet's layered model.
The Internet is simultaneously a technological and a
socioeconomic space-it is not a space like a nation's territory. Larry
Lessig pointed out more than a decade ago that the unlimited territory
of the Internet is not treated as a space governed by a sovereign, and
the Internet itself is not, and cannot, be treated as a sovereign entity.4
Bertrand de la Chappelle has augmented the discussion with some
enlightening observations about why governments are so frustrated
1 Patrick S. Ryan, Sarah Falvey & Ronak Merchant, Hhen the Cloud goes Local: The Global
Problem with Data Localization, COMPUTER, Dec. 2013, available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2370850.
2 Bertrand de La Chapelle, Multistakeholder Governance -Principles and Challenges of an
Innovative Political Paradigm, in MIND #2: INTERNET POLICY MAKING (Wolfgang
Kleinw ichter ed., Berlin 2011), available at http://www.collaboratory.de/w/MIND 2-
_InternetPolicy Making [hereinafter de La Chapelle, Multistakeholder Governance].
3 FinalActs of the World Conference on International Telecommunications (Dubai, 2012),
INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS UNION (Dec. 2012), available at
http://www.itu.int/en/weit-12/Documents/final-acts-weit-12.pdf [hereinafter WCIT-12
Final Acts].
4 LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE 2.0: CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE (2006), available at
http://codev2.cc/download+remix/Lessig-Codev2.pdf (arguing that the Internet itself is
not a sovereign entity).
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with the Internet's independence-he points out that the concept of
sovereignty, was an innovation from the Treaty of Westphalia in
1648.5 Although the Westphalian system enabled countries to draw
boundaries between each other and establish ruling authority within
certain borders, this model clashes with the current governance model
of virtual spaces online. What is the solution to this conflict?
A. Governing in a Shared Environment
The Internet is a shared environment; as such, the decisions made
on a sovereign basis in one geography may affect Internet users in
other geographies-users in the rest of the world's Internet
ecosystem. 6 To borrow another environmental metaphor, pollution
from a river that runs through one country could flow into other
countries downstream. Thus, a territory's sovereign decision to pollute
a river can have an impact on that territory's neighbors.7 The
conundrum we face today is that we are all so connected that we have
a shared responsibility to each other in ways never previously
envisioned. In our highly connected online environments, we have
shared virtual commons, and no actor can evade accountability for
their actions, even those actions considered or deemed sovereign.
Internet use-and the governance of it-should take into account
the perspectives of all who have a stake, regardless of whether they are
part of the sovereign decision-maker's geographic territory. While the
Internet is a physical artifact with components in many countries, the
virtual space created by that artifact is defined by logical boundaries
rather than geophysical borders. These boundaries are expressed in
various ways: as the connectivity of the autonomous systems (i.e.,
networks) of the Internet, by the divisions expressed by the Domain
5 De la Chappelle, Multistakeholder Governance, supra note 2. See also Dan Philpott,
Sovereignty, in THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta ed.,
Summer 20o Edition), available at
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2oo/entries/sovereignty (recounting the history
that led to the treaty).
6 See De La Chapelle, Multistakeholder Governance, supra note 2.
7 See Patrick S. Ryan, Application of the Public-Trust Doctrine and Principles of Natural
Resource Management to Electromagnetic Spectrum, 10 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L.
REv. 2 (2004), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=556673 (describing how
environmental law principles and water-law principles are relevant to the technology
sector).
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Name System (DNS) space, and by applications such as Facebook,
Evernote, Twitter, and iTunes.
With these thoughts in mind, it's clear that complications can
ensue when sovereign nations decide to filter or block Internet
content. It's also clear why many organizations-particularly, those
organizations outside of government-embrace a "multi-stakeholder
governance model" for the Internet, a model that solicits decision-
making input from governments, but also the private sector, civil
society, and the technical community. This is how the Internet became
what it is today, and as the United Nations Working Group on
Internet Governance articulated it in 2005, multi-stakeholder Internet
governance "is the development and application by governments, the
private sector and civil society, in their respective roles, of shared
principles, norms, rules, decision-making procedures, and
programmes that shape the evolution and use of the Internet."'
Because borders are less relevant in the virtual world, the multi-
stakeholder approach provides a way to transcend geographic
boundaries of physical space and focus instead on the users of the
Internet's virtual spaces. To be fair, the multi-stakeholder approach
can be frustrating and clumsy-as any democratic process is-but it
provides the best mechanism for governing the Internet's space
because of its inclusiveness.
B. The New Deal for Internet Governance
There is no single "one stop shop" for Internet governance.
Instead, the Internet's rules have rapidly evolved in diverse
organizations, and navigating these organizations is not easy. For
example, many of the Internet's technical standards are set primarily
by the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) that has cooperated on
the development of open standards since the early days of Internet
operation. The Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and
Numbers administers the Domain Name System and IP address
assignment processes in addition to maintaining tables of protocol
parameters needed for operation of the Internet Protocol suite.
Additionally civil society gets engaged to provide independent
perspective on behalf of users, and the private sector that invests in
the infrastructure. Moreover, governments are heavily involved in
8 Tunis Agenda for the Information Society, § 35, WSIS-05/TUNIS/DOC/6(Rev. f)-E
(2005), available at http://www.itu.int/wsis/doCs2/tunis/off/6rev.html [hereinafter
Tunis Agenda].
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regulating the Internet through rules for things such as privacy, fair
use, libel, competition (antitrust), various forms of licensing, and the
like. The technology community is spread across many sectors and its
work creates implicit and sometimes explicit bounds on behavior.9
These are just a few examples, and amazingly, all these groups loosely
collaborate very effectively with each other to set collective rules for
the advancement of the Internet ecosystem.
A fundamental challenge to governing conduct on the Internet is
that the speed of innovation on this complex network is so high that
traditional regulatory practices can't keep up. As a result, other
stakeholders push and pull so as to seek consensus among the myriad
technical, legal, political, and business arguments proffered. To
complicate matters further, this global real-time medium has caused a
paradigm shift in the aforementioned professional arenas. Unlike the
regulators of telecommunications firms, for example, there is no
longer a "one stop shop" that people can turn to as they once could to
address the relatively simple set of issues that the telephone company
once faced.
It's become axiomatic that the Internet is the backbone or
operating system of global markets, representing an increasing
amount of Gross Domestic Product in most developed countries."
One by one, specialized organizations like the UN Human Rights
Council have begun to engage in the Internet governance discourse-
not by joining evolving Internet Governance policy forums, but by
issuing reports and policies covering Internet practices from their
specific perspectives." Such involvement adds another major
challenge for the development of Internet governance. The more
stakeholders that join in the discourse, the more challenging it is for
the larger body of participants to understand the concerns of each
individual stakeholder.
9 LARRY LESSIG, CODE: AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE (Basic Books, 1999) (one of the
main premises of the book is that "code is law," emphasizing the important work of
programmers in setting standards for behavior online).
10 A compilation of many economic studies that show the value of the Internet in the
world's economies can be found at www.valueoftheweb.com.
1United Nations General Assembly, Human Rights Council, Resolution regarding the
promotion, protection and enjoyment of human rights on the Internet, A/HRC/2o/L.13
(June 29, 2012); see also dillian C. York, UN Human Rights Council Resolution on Internet
and Human Rights a Step in the Right Direction, EFF DEEPLINKS (July 26, 2012),
available at https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2o12/o7/un-human-rights-council-
resolution-Internet-and-human-rights -step-right -direction.
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The Internet is driving convergence of traditionally independent
media. Today more and more movies, television, radio, telephony, and
print media are either born-digital or are digitized and subsequently
use the flexible infrastructure of the Internet. Each of these media has
well-established and mandated governance institutions and has
created a body of national and international policies for its specific
technology. As the "new deal" on Internet governance evolves,
however, it will have to resolve issues associated with overlapping
mandates between media policy institutions and emerging Internet
governance institutions. More to the point, many of the policies
governing traditional media are not necessarily transferable to the
Internet ecosystem or even advisable in the Internet-enabled version
of the service. In fact, Internet-based technology convergence may
necessitate changes in or the elimination of technology-specific
governance practices.
In this Paper, we will address the following questions: how can we
best define the respective roles of stakeholders to address rapidly
evolving issues associated with Internet governance, and how can we
frame a process of "enhanced cooperation" to ensure international
policymaking reflects the shared nature of the global socioeconomic
online space? Given the critical nature of the systemic challenges we
have identified above, we will propose an open, productive multi-
stakeholder governance model as the answer to these questions.
II. MAPPING THE MANDATES GENERALLY
The Internet is a complicated regime that in many ways mirrors
the social, political, and business contentions of the world in which we
live. David Clark (with others) once summarized the governance
challenges nicely by stating that "as the Internet becomes mainstream
it inevitably moves from being an engineering curiosity to being a
mirror of the societies in which it operates. '"12 Indeed, Internet
governance has always been what Clark called a "tussle" among
different stakeholders groups (e.g., telecommunication firms, online
service providers, users, law enforcement agencies, and regulators)-
not to mention tussles among members of the same stakeholder
group. But given that the Internet's complexity is growing rapidly
because of the challenges of globalization (and inapplicable arguments
12 D. D. Clark, J. Wroclawski, K. Sollins, & R. Braden, Tussle in Cyberspace: Defining
Tomorrow's Internet, in Proe. ACM SIGCOMM (Aug. 2002), available at
http://groups.esail.mit.edu/ana/Publications/PubPDFs/Tussle2002.pdf [hereinafter
Tussle in Cyberspace].
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for sovereignty), the following advice Clark et al. advanced in 2002
hits the nail on the head:
Design for variation in outcome, so that the outcome
can be different in different places, and the tussle takes
place within the design, not by distorting or violating it.
Do not design so as to dictate the outcome. Rigid
designs will be broken; designs that permit variation
will flex under pressure and survive.13
Said another way, we should find ways to experiment with governance
policies and allow for alignment to occur naturally on all levels (local,
national, and regional), rather than having one centralized
international treaty on Internet governance. Rick Whitt also makes a
convincing case for adaptive policymaking. 4 This is one way that
some try to resolve the "tussle" (i.e., the inevitable tensions) that will
always exist among the Internet's diverse stakeholders. Although it's
theoretically possible for a top-down approach to Internet governance
to work, and while it's impossible to predict the future, we strongly
believe that a top-down approach is far more likely to hinder
innovation (this is, in essence, Dr. Cerfs oft-repeated refrain of
"permissionless innovation"). Unlike the multi-stakeholder groups
that foster the Internet's development, top-down approaches rarely
seek consensus among different groups, and so not only do they
hinder innovation, but their effectiveness is short lived.
We cannot survey all the multi-stakeholder institutions in this
Paper, however one of the areas that we propose to continue to
strengthen is the role of the Internet Governance Forum (IGF). The
IGF was set up in 2005 by heads of state as a venue for airing policy
positions of various kinds without the negotiations that take place
when there is a treaty conference or position statement. Indeed, the
IGF has been positioned as a deliberation body (not decision-making
body) for all stakeholders to (i) raise emergent Internet governance
challenges and report on progress and solutions to existing
governance issues, (ii) discuss the best approach to address
13Id.
14 See Richard S. Whitt, Adaptive Policy-Making: Evolving and Applying Emergent
Solutions for U.S. Communications Policy, 61 FED. COMM. L.J. 483 (2009) (the author
advances a proposal for "adaptive policy making" by governments to make adaptive
changes with technology based on the premise of "enabling without dictating." Many of the
ideas in this Paper are built on the inspiration from this piece).
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governance issues and appropriate parties to address those issues, and
(iii) build voluntary enhanced cooperation groups made up of
institutions with mandates to address identified challenges.15 We will
use the IGF as an example throughout this Paper and will address it
again in Section IV below.
Returning to the discussion of how to experiment with policies,
the multi-stakeholder approach is one way to put into focus another
one of Clark's observations, that "[f]unctions that are within a tussle
space should be logically separated from functions outside of that
space, even if there is no compelling technical reason to do so. Doing
this allows a tussle to be played out with minimal distortion of other
aspects of the system's function."16 In other words, we should
endeavor to separate policy issues for analysis as we would any
experiment in the technical or scientific sense. This kind of thing
happens all the time in politics. To take one example, the LGBT
community often joins forces in order to influence state or federal
laws that affect same-sex relationships. In that context, the LGBT
community attempts to speak with a common voice for LGBT issues,
in spite of broad internal representation of all political interests within
that community, and doing so provides a global framework
understanding of that set of policy issues. 7
In the Internet, similarly, it is important for all the stakeholders to
have a forum to make their voices heard and to have equal voices on
par with other actors, because these stakeholders each present unique
perspectives on important topics such as privacy and security,
15 This is our paraphrasing of the Tunis Agenda, supra note 8. (Note that point (iii) is
covered by the mandate as it states: "Help to find solutions to the issues arising from the
use and misuse of the Internet, of particular concern to everyday users; Facilitate discourse
between bodies dealing with different cross-cutting international public policies regarding
the Internet and discuss issues that do not fall within the scope of any existing body;
Interface with appropriate inter-governmental organizations and other institutions on
matters under their purview; Strengthen and enhance the engagement of stakeholders in
existing and/or future Internet governance mechanisms, particularly those from
developing countries; -importantly the stakeholders form the enhanced cooperation
groups voluntarily and then they perform all decision making / policy making, not the
IGF.").
16 Tussle in Cyberspace, supra note 12.
17 See, e.g., the Gay & Lesbian Victory Institute, available at
http://www.victoryinstitute.org/mission/mission (The objective of the Gay & Lesbian
Victory Institute is to provide support to lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender leaders in
all forms of government, and in all political affiliations. While their mission clearly involves
politics and helping put people in positions of political influence, it is an issue-based
advocacy platform.)
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surveillance, copyright, and the like. Even if their voices are not
internally unified, we can make broad assumptions about what the
government's views are on surveillance (generally, governments say
more surveillance is better, it helps catch the bad guys); or civil
society's view (generally, a view that all surveillance must be checked
by due process); and even the technical community (generally, a view
that agrees with civil society but develops encryption and other tools
to provide choices to all stakeholders). Breaking the pieces apart helps
everyone understand the issues best, and then the complicated work
of making sure that they are addressed in the global ecosystem can
proceed. Doing so enables groups that are truly experts in their field to
opine in a meaningful and effective way.
Scholars have, for some time, been comfortable describing the
Internet's technical architecture through a "layered model" that
segregates and explains the different operations. Although there are
different ways to look at these layers, at the bottom of the layered
model, there is almost always the infrastructure layer-the highway
that enables the traffic. At the top of the layered model, most scholars
agree that there is a content layer where technical operations matter
less but other policies like intellectual property rights and free
expression are most directly implicated. In this Paper, we propose the
addition of a new Social Layer. This Social Layer provides an
additional lens for us to identify and stratify the relevant institutions
that have a mandate to deal with the ongoing steering of practices and
continuous assessment and handling of emerging policy issues. As
shown in Illustration 1, this new layer would deal with practices that
define paramount rights and principles associated with "social
conduct" online.18
i8 See Yochai Benkler, From Consumers to Users: Shifting the Deeper Structures of
Regulation Towards Sustainable Commons and User Access, 52 FED. COMM. L.J. 561
(2000).
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Illustration 1:
Social Layer Added to the Established Layered Model of Internet
Governance
We provide this conceptualization in order to trigger discussion
about which institutions and stakeholder groups should legitimately
be involved in which Internet policy issues. Put differently, we believe
that it will be beneficial to the operation of the whole online ecosystem
if the mandates of institutions are mapped and clarified with regard to
their relevance in steering Internet governance practices and
policymaking. Hence, Illustration 2 shows a schematic example of
mapping of institutions with relevant mandates overlaid on the layers
of Internet governance. 19 Here we show the IGF as positioned in the
center with its special role in the middle and as a less-defined cloud.
The IGF has no decision-making mandate itself, but is instead meant
to facilitate and moderate decision-making to take place in thematic
governance institutions. In Clark's terminology, at the IGF, we're
19 The illustration by no means covers all relevant institutions. Instead, it is meant to
provide a visual perspective of the approach in general.
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separating the "tussles" in a forum where they can be analyzed in
workshops and discussion sessions and then brought back to the
various other forums for decisions.
Illustration 2:
Internet Governance Ecosystem
2°
Social Layer HR ... i
U N -~ i IS U...
Content Layer IGGM
OECD WVEF
Logical Layer I C I
I nfrastructure LaYS
Under the current multi-stakeholder Internet governance
ecosystem, governments do not play a dominant role in governance
but instead participate on equal footing as representatives of their
respective constituents, either through local rules or through
participation in government-focused bodies like the International
Telecommunication Union (ITU), which is described in more detail in
the next section. Governments maintain a uniquely important role in
Internet governance, of course, as they ultimately issue rules in the
public interest and develop mandates to law enforcement,
competition, consumer protection agencies, data protection
20 Full names of the abbreviated institutions, as well as the core of their mandates, can be
found in the Appendix.
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authorities, and other governmental and intergovernmental agencies.
It is important to remember that governments are also participants in
many other fora besides the ITU: for example, they have a special
place to express their views in ICANN through the Government
Advisory Committee, and they regularly sponsor discussions on
economic policy issues at the OECD.
However, given that each government is itself a stakeholder group,
we have refrained from explicitly including individual governments in
the illustration. Because Internet policy challenges are, as we pointed
out, global commons challenges in almost all cases as well as
challenges for sovereign nations to address, we assess the
international governance sphere to be most important.
III. MAPPING TO THE EXISTING ECOSYSTEM
We believe that one of the greatest challenges that lies before us
today is to propose a way for the existing governance mechanisms to
find their place within the Internet's layered model. Once they have
found that place, these organizations should endeavor to carry out
their work to the best of their ability in that space, while leaving other
multistakeholder groups to develop additional niches.
A. The Experience at WCIT in Dubai
The multi-stakeholder Internet governance ecosystem may seem
foreign to those who aren't involved in it in a meaningful way. We
believe that this lack of familiarity is one of the main drivers that led
to a conflict at WCIT-12, held in Dubai, United Arab Emirates. At this
conference, the United Nations, through the ITU convened the world's
powers, ostensibly to update the International Telecommunication
Regulations (ITR), a decades-old telecommunications treaty. Instead,
revisions were proposed to the treaty that would have had a chilling
effect on both the availability and accessibility of Internet content. In
this section, we will look at some aspects of the proposed treaty and
outline some of the issues that arose in terms of the institutions that
govern the Internet.
The ITR negotiations showed starkly that there are two broad
divisions in the world. On the one side are Europe, Canada and the
USA, essentially the countries largely responsible for the development
of the Internet and many of its applications. On the other side are
Russia, China, and the group of countries designated by the ITU as the
"Arab States"-countries that want to exercise much more control over
the flow of information on the Internet. Latin Americans remain
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somewhat undecided (with four voting against the treaty) and African
countries (with the exception of Kenya, Malawi and Gambia) joined
the Arab States, Russia, China, and others. This divide is what we
referred to in a previous paper as a "Titanic Moment," a virtual
collision between the promise of new technologies and the desire to
impose new regulations on those technologies by the others who
either felt left out of the Internet governance process or, in the case of
authoritarian regimes, see the Internet as a threat to their power.2 1 In
a more cynical view, with the recent discussions on Internet
surveillance, it is also possible that one group of governments have the
preference and tradition of exercising control and influence through
restrictions, regulations and laws, while other governments see the
openness of the Internet as an opportunity to control through
surveillance of it. Some commenters have opined that this is the case
of Iran, which previously blocked Facebook entirely, but then
inexplicably unleashed all restrictions of it, at least for a day.22
The resulting treaty from WCIT-12 represented an unresolved
collision between two ideologies. In total, 89 countries approved the
treaty, including Russia, China, Arab States, and many others in Asia,
Africa, and Latin America (referred to here as the "Dubai-89"). The 55
countries that did not sign the treaty include all of the European
Union, the United States, Canada, and a few others (the "Dubai-55").
Many countries entered "reservations" which add contours and
limitations to what the countries ultimately approve.23 In the
remaining section, we will look at some examples of how these two
groups view the tussle. As we will see below, some of the starkest
philosophical divisions between the Dubai-89 and the Dubai-55 can
be observed in these groups' conflation of the infrastructure and
logical layers with the content and social layers.
21 See Patrick S. Ryan, The ITU and the Internet's Titanic Moment, STAN. TECH. L. REv. 8
(2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=211o5o9.
22 See Thomas Erdbrink, Iran Bars Social Media Again After a Day, N.Y. TIMES, Sep. 17,
2013, at Aio, available at http://goo.gl/Lc7Sos.
23 See Gerry Oberst, Regulatory Review: ITURules and Reservations, VIA SATELLITE (Dec.
1, 2002), available at http://www.satellitetoday.com/via/32244.html (providing a good
overview of how the reservations work in the ITU treaty making process).
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B. The Infrastructure and Logical Layers
The Internet's naming and numbering system form the core of its
infrastructure. Although the infrastructure and logical layers are both
in the technical area of the layered model, significant skirmishes have
arisen out of a debate as to what organization is best suited for
governance of these areas. The Internet Corporation for the
Assignment of Names and Numbers (ICANN) is a non-profit, multi-
stakeholder organization that has been tasked with the responsibility
of providing the world's Internet community with a hierarchical (in
the sense of having one single system), and distributed (by leaving
responsibilities to regional registries) naming system. This is a
common framework for the administration of top-level domains like
.net, .com, .edu, .xxx, .fr, .de, .br, and numeric Internet Protocol
addresses.24 A single coherent mechanism for naming and numbering
forestalls chaos and confusion. For example, imagine the confusion if
typing www.pepsi.com in one country brought you to the Pepsi
website, but typing the same address elsewhere brought you to a
different destination. ICANN helps administer the rules of the road for
hundreds of thousands or more of interconnected servers-the
Domain Name System, or DNS-to act in concert to make sure that
websites around the world can be accessed under one singular naming
and numbering plan.
Anybody that has spent time looking at ICANN can testify that the
organization is complicated, acronym-ridden, and hard to follow.
While the ICANN decision-making process is no model for simplicity,
its arcane processes are designed to ensure that the voices of many
different stakeholders in the Internet are heard, while at the same
time isolating groups within specific constituencies to assure that
perspectives from different groups are clear. As a consequence, this
also means governments have an equal voice with others in the
community, like businesses, academics, and civil society.25 This has
24 See Jay P. Kesan & Rajiv C. Shah, Fool Us Once Shame on You - Fool Us Twice Shame on
Us: Hhat We Can Learn from the Privatizations of the Internet Backbone Network and
the Domain Name System, 79 WASH. U. L. Q. 89, 171 (2001), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=26o834 (providing a historical overview of the creation of
ICANN and other institutions).
25 Tunis Agenda, supra note 8. (Recognizing that Internet governance requires
collaboration of all parties: "Furthermore, we commit ourselves to the stability and security
of the Internet as a global facility and to ensuring the requisite legitimacy of its governance,
based on the full participation of all stakeholders, from both developed and developing
countries, within their respective roles and responsibilities.").
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been the long-standing complaint of Brazil, for example, and it
partially explains why this democratic country would align on this
issue with Russia, China and others. After the ITU hosted the World
Telecommunications/ICT Policy Forum in Geneva in May 2013, a
representative from the Brazilian government explained their
frustration with the limited role that governments have:
The fact is that governments so far have only had a
limited advisory role in international Internet
Governance, and no actual involvement in the decision
making process. Recent events have indicated that even
long standing advice provided by governments on
certain issues has had little impact on the actual
decisions relating to matters of their direct interest.
Regretfully, attempts to deal with this fact have
suffered from the low level of participation of the
majority of governments in existing international
Internet Governance fora.26
In spite of the statement above, we believe that it's not fair to say that
governments don't have "actual involvement" in the decision-making
process. The aforementioned excerpt is a reference to the work of
ICANN, which is, in fact, required by its bylaws to take into
consideration the views of governments and other stakeholders.27
What governments want is a more central and decisive role. However,
here's the rub: no party-including governments-have a veto
authority, and in many respects this is essentially what Brazil is asking
for here. On the one hand, a democratically elected government like
Brazil is well-suited to represent its citizens' and companies' interests
much better than those stakeholders can independently. However,
with more than 192 countries in the world, the democratic tradition of
one country or another does not and should not vest any government
26 Daniel Cavalanti, Operationalizing the Role of Governments in Internet Governance,
ITU BLOG, June 5, 2013, available at
http://itu4u.wordpress.COm/2013/o6/05/Operationalizing-the-role-of-governments-in-
Internet-governance.
27 See, e.g., Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers, Bylaws for Internet
Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers as amended Apr 11, 2013: Article XI,
Section 2.1, available at http://www.icann.org/en/about/governance/bylaws#XI
(permitting the Governmental Advisory Committee to "put issues to the Board directly,
either by way of comment or prior advice, or by way of specifically recommending action or
new policy development or revision to existing policies.").
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with more force than another, so evening the playing field across all
governments and stakeholders is a better approach.
Recall that the work that ICANN does is fundamental in setting up
a universal naming and numbering system, including .NET and .COM
and applications currently underway for new domains like .GAY,
.AMAZON, and .PATAGONIA.28 What governments want is not
"actual involvement" in the decision making process-what they want
is a veto right. In essence, governments want the ability to override
decisions that ICANN may make that would offend the interests of the
region.29 To many Latin American countries, for example, the Amazon
River and the Patagonia region must be protected in the Internet's
domain system, and although Patagonia bowed to the pressure to
withdraw their application, the rule for that kind of protection isn't
always so clear in ICANN's practices.3" So, as things stand now, if
ICANN and the set of applicants are not able to work out a
compromise with these governments, then these governments will feel
fueled more than ever to assert their power, one way or another, and
to demand the veto that they desire.
This tension between governments desiring increased power may
never be fully resolved, and that standoff is, itself perhaps, an
acceptable compromise. But the Internet community will need to
remain vigilant in order to assure that the ecosystem continues to
innovate while keeping a close eye on deliberate moves by some
countries to dramatically change the rules. This is exactly what
happened at WCIT-12, which saw countries and regions wanting to
use the ITRs as a wholesale opportunity to divest ICANN of its
authority and bring domain-name administration within the scope of
a government-only agency like the ITU. Specifically, one proposal
introduced in Dubai by Russia, UAE, China, Saudi Arabia, Algeria,
Sudan and Egypt would have required the following:
Member States shall have equal rights to manage the
Internet, including in regard to the allotment,
28 Eli Sugarman, Who Should Own '.Patagonia?', THE ATLANTIC (Apr. 23, 2013), available
at http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2o13/04/who-should-own-
patagonia/275214.
29 PerP y Brasil se enfrentan a Amazon en defensa de la Amazonia, EL COMERCIO (May 4,
2013), available at http://elcomercio.pe/actualidad/1572165/noticia-peru-brasil-se-
enfrentan-amazon-defensa-amazonia.
30 See Gaelyn Scott, It's 'No' to '.POLO,' Go LEGAL (Jan 3, 2014), available at
http://www.golegal.co.za/business/its-no-polo.
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assignment and reclamation of Internet numbering,
naming, addressing and identification resources to
support for the operation and development of basic
Internet infrastructure.31
The idea that "States shall have equal rights to manage the Internet" is
key because it's an assertion of the supremacy of governments
("states") and there is no mention of the other stakeholders-civil
society, the technical community, or the private sector-that currently
participate in Internet governance. The proposal above was not totally
unilateral; however, it was accompanied by a perfunctory recital that
calls for the need for the multi-stakeholder development of "shared
principles, norms, rules, decision-making procedures and
programs."32 However, the recitals made in this sentence are an empty
vessel and would be impossible to reconcile with the clear statement
that "States shall ... manage the Internet."
So, if shifting the functionality of ICANN to a government-only
mechanism was important to at least some members of the Dubai-89,
why was it not adopted in the final treaty? There is no single answer,
but in a surprise to many, the ITU itself played a mediating role. The
ITU's Secretary General Hamadoun Tour invited Fadi Chehad6, the
new CEO of ICANN, to deliver comments on WCIT-12'S opening day.33
Chehad6's appearance was itself somewhat controversial within the
ICANN community, which had witnessed a series of multiple, public
face-offs between ICANN and the ITU. In one such confrontation, the
ITU publicly snubbed the request from ICANN's previous CEO Rod
31 International Telecommunications Union [ITU], Document DT-X, Proposal by Russia,
UAE, China, Saudi Arabia, Algeria, Sudan and Egypt, WORLD CONFERENCE ON
INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS (Dec. 5, 2012) at § 3A.2, available at
http://files.wcitleaks.org/public/Merged%2oUAE%2oo8212.pdf. This provision also
appears in International Telecommunications Union [ITU], Document 47-E, Proposal by
Algeria, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, China, UAE, Russia, Iraq and Sudan, World Conference
on International Telecommunications (Dee.11, 2012) at § 3A.2, available at
http://files.wcitleaks.org/public/S12-WCIT12-C-oo47!!MSW-E.pdf [hereinafter,
Document 47-E].
32 See Document 47-E, § 3A.1, supra note 31 ("Internet governance shall be effected
through the development and application by governments, the private sector and civil
society of shared principles, norms, rules, decision-making procedures and programs that
shape the evolution and use of the Internet").
33 See Lee-Roy Chetty, A New Season of Cooperation Between ICANN And ITU, ITU BLOG
(Dec. 5, 2012), available at http://goo.gl/YRjznZ.
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Beckstrom to attend one of their Council meetings.34 Because of this
history, Chehad6's keynote at the opening of WCIT-12 sent a clear
message to the world that ICANN is willing to engage with the ITU
and to put its fights in the past.35
So far, things are moving well in that regard. The unspecified
collaboration with the ITU has been billed as part of Chehad6's "new
season at ICANN," a phrase that has been picked up and cited now in
thousands of articles and web entries.36 In the end, since the WCIT
proceedings happen only partially in the open, we may never know
exactly why or how the vehement proposals to take over ICANN's
work disappeared in spite of the proposals by Russia, UAE, China,
Saudi Arabia, Algeria, Sudan and Egypt. But we know that these
proposals existed and were hotly discussed in preparatory meetings,
blogs, listservs and other spaces prior to WCIT-12, and then they
quietly disappeared into the fog of the WCIT negotiations without any
public debate. It is therefore reasonable to conclude-even without
direct evidence-that ICANN's pro-active engagement helped with
that process. This particular standoff will continue, but it will be
fought on another day.
Significant unresolved issues about the naming and numbering
system will continue, then, perhaps indefinitely. In our view, one of
the most important actions in future years in order to reduce the need
for further standoffs in naming & numbering will be determined by
how ICANN proceeds. ICANN needs to continue to reach out to
countries and regions that currently feel they don't have a voice in
Internet governance. ICANN will also need to continue to take steps to
help governments feel a stronger sense of engagement in the ICANN
processes and feel that their voices are heard, and to show that
disputes like .AMAZON and .PATAGONIA can be resolved within the
system.37 The new leadership at ICANN is already achieving this goal,
34 Kevin Murphy, ITUchiefsnubs ICANN's Beckstrom, DOMAIN INCITE (Aug. 24, 2010),
available at http://domainincite.com/1857-itu-chief-snubs-icanns-beekstrom.
35 See Fadi Chehad6 Addresses WCIT Opening Ceremony in Dubai, ICANN Video Archive
(Dec. 3, 2012) available at http://goo.gl/iNyYH6.
36 A search conducted on June 11, 2013 for the search terms "chehade 'new season' icann"
produces 6,20o results. See http://goo.gl/wxqLU.
37 In the case of .PATAGONIA, between the drafting of this Paper and its final publication,
this gTLD was in fact withdrawn by the company that proposed it (the clothing
manufacturer with the name Patagonia) because of all the pressure on it from different
stakeholders. In many ways, this move, itself, represents the success of the multi-
stakeholder process in action.
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in part, by announcing its intention to move and replicate
responsibilities outside the United States, with offices announced to
be opened in Istanbul, Singapore and Beijing.3S This is a step in the
right direction.
C. Broadband Connectivity: Bringing the Internet to Everybody
In rough numbers, we are approaching 3 billion Internet users
today, and another 4 billion citizens that don't have access to the
Internet-although they may well be affected by it. Most governments
want to increase broadband rollout and connectivity for their citizens,
but at the same time they struggle to identify the best economic model
to pay for such connectivity. Should broadband be considered a public
good like roads or sewer systems, or should governments abstain from
involvement in order to promote competition?39 These policy
questions find their home squarely in the infrastructure layer.
A grand experiment is underway to address these questions, and it
will be interesting to observe in the next few years. Australia and
Uruguay, for example, are moving to embrace a version of a relatively
nationalized model, viewing the Internet as a taxpayer-funded
commons-like roads or sewer systems-while countries like the
United States and Bulgaria are taking a more market-oriented
approach.40 These different models are high-level manifestations of
two very different social philosophies. Internet users in Uruguay's de
38 Ryan Huang, ICANN picks Beo'ing to open first engagement center, ZDNET (Apr. 8,
2013), available at http://www.zdnet.com/en/icann-picks-beijing-to-open-first-
engagement-center-7000013656/. See also Mikael Ricknas, ICANN announces opening of
Istanbul office as part of globalization effort, PC WORLD (Apr. 25, 2013), available at
http://www.peworld.com/article/2036366/icann-announces-opening-of-istanbul-office-
as-part-of-globalization-effort.html.
39 See SUSAN P. CRAWFORD, CAPTIVE AUDIENCE: THE TELECOM INDUSTRYAND MONOPOLY
POWER IN THE NEW GILDED AGE (Yale University Press, 2013) (making the case that
broadband access in the United States is becoming a monopoly affair and more
government intervention is required).
40 See Susan P. Crawford, The Looming Cable Monopoly, 29 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. INTER
ALIA 34 (2010), available at
http://yalelawandpolicy.org/sites/default/files/YLPRIA29-Crawford.pdf (arguing that the
lack of regulation in the U.S. is leading to consolidation and unchecked monopolies in the
broadband market, decreasing competition). See also Speed Broadband Deployment in
Europe: The Netherlands and Bulgaria Compared, TPRC (2010), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract= 1989172 (showing how competition is intense in Bulgaria, with
670 official ISPs and as many as 2,000 unregistered ISPs).
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facto single-provider system seem to enjoy the lowest prices for
broadband of all their peers in Latin America.4 Further, in 2010
Uruguay had the highest broadband penetration in Latin America.42
By contrast, Bulgaria is also making a great case for the free market,
where anecdotes from colleagues report that there are more than 8oo
(some say as many as 2,000) service providers and consumers have
broad choice.43 It is too early to opine which model is best-the models
are still being vetted-and consumers will win in the long run. While
there may be no single correct model, we believe one thing is certain:
mandating one kind of economic model through an international
treaty would be a mistake.
Turning back to the WCIT, a mandated economic model is
precisely what several actors had hoped to accomplish in Dubai. The
debate was initiated by the European Telecommunications Network
Operators' Association (ETNO), a group of European
telecommunication providers led by Telecom Italia, Telefonica, France
Telecom, and Deutsche Telekom.44 The ETNO proposal called for a
"sending party pays" system that would have been mandated by law
through the treaty.45 In essence, this would have meant that any
content provider on the Internet would need to pay to have their
information delivered to the recipient-this would be in addition to
41Banda ancha uruguaya es la mds barata de Am~rica latina, EL PAlS (June 16, 2012),
available at http://genteynegocios.elpais.com.uy/banda-ancha-uruguaya-es-la-mas-
barata-de-america-latina.
42 See Cisco Broadband Barometer, Uruguay Leads Broadband Penetration in Latin
America, Cisco THE NETWORK (Nov. 16, 2011), available at
http://newsroom.cisco.com/uk/press-release-
content?articleld=554136&type=webeontent.
43 Tanya Todorva, Broadband Internet access is not a problem for Bulgaria,
STROITELSTVO (Jan. 21, 2013), available at
http://stroitelstvo.info/show.php?storyid= 1987738.
44 See Mark Page, Luca Rossi, & Colin Rand, A.T. Kearney Report: A Viable Future Model
for the Internet (201o), available at
http://ww.atkearney.com/index.php/Publications/a-viablefuture-model-for -the-
Internet.html (sponsored by Deutsche Telekom, France Telecom, Telefonica, and Telecom
Italia). See also J. Scott Marcus and Alessandro Monti, WIK -Consult: Network Operators
and Content Providers: Who Bears the Cost? (Sept. 13, 2011), available at SSRN:
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1926768 (making the counterargument to the Kearney report).
45 See Cynthia Wong, et. al., ETNO Proposal Threatens to Impair Access to Open, Global
Internet, CENTER FOR DEMOCRACY & TECHNOLOGY (June 21, 2012), available at
https://www.edt.org/files/pdfs/CDT Analysis-ETNO-Proposal.pdf.
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the fees the service provider already pays to connect to the Internet
and in addition to the fees that the user pays for their access. Recall,
however, that the ITU's treaty-making process requires proposals to
be introduced and adopted by countries, not by individuals or groups.
However, ETNO was successful in finding a country to make the
proposal on its behalf-Cameroon-and their proposal was then
adopted by most of the African countries in a common proposal.46
Specifically, the proposal asked for the following provision in the
International Telecommunications Regulations (ITRs):
Operating Agencies shall endeavor to provide sufficient
telecommunications facilities to meet requirements of
and demand for international telecommunication
services. For this purpose, and to ensure an adequate
return on investment in high bandwidth
infrastructures, operating agencies shall negotiate
commercial agreements to achieve a sustainable system
of fair compensation for telecommunications services
and, where appropriate, respecting the principle of
sending party network pays. 47
The ETNO proposal received some of the most fervent attention in
the lead-up to Dubai. If adopted, the proposal would have completely
undermined the economic model of the Internet (wherein users pay
for their Internet access) by imposing an additional cost on "senders"
of information. Such a model would have devastated the openness of
the Internet because providers of free content would have had to pay
additional fees, effectively increasing the digital divide by forcing
economic choices that would benefit only the telecommunications
46 International Telecommunications Union [ITU], Document 19-E, African Common
Proposals for the Work of the Conference, World Conference on International
Telecommunications (Nov. 2, 2012), available at http://files.weitleaks.org/public/S12-
WCIT12-C-oo19!!MSW-E.pdf. (Article 6 contains the provisions of the ETNO proposal).
See also International Telecommunications Union [ITU], Document 15-E, Submission by
Republic of Cameroon, World Conference on International Telecommunications (Oct. 2,
2012), available at http://files.weitleaks.org/public/S12-WCIT12-C-oo15!!MSW-E.pdf. In
addition to the changes in Article 6 that the African countries proposed together, the
Cameroon proposal includes a definition for "hubbing" that requires "full payment due to
the hub." Id., at § 2.15.
47 Council Working Group Contribution 109, CWT WCIT12/C 109 (June 6, 2012),
available at http://files.weitleaks.org/publie/ETNO%2oCio9.pdf.
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service providers.48 To build on an example of how this would work,
free online courseware, like those available at MIT, Stanford, or the
Khan Academy, might no longer be offered if these non-profit
organizations had to pay an additional fee to deliver their content to
the developing world.49
After months of debate on this point prior to Dubai, the
conference Chair moved these provisions out of the core text and into
a relatively toothless resolution annexed to the ITRs, mandating that
the ITU create a "study group" to recommend further action.5O On the
one hand, the Chair's decision to move the debate into a non-binding
study group may have been a good political compromise. However,
the ITU is divided into three sections, one for standards (the "ITU-T"
sector), a second for spectrum (the "ITU-R" sector) and a third for
development (the "ITU-D" sector). The study group was formed
within ITU-T and we remain quite concerned because ITU-T-as the
division in the ITU that a group that designs telecommunications
standards-is not an appropriate place to evaluate economic business
models for the Internet. If such a policy were to be analyzed, the
OECD would be a better place because of its competence in economic
analysis-and in fact, the OECD has weighed in on this very matter
and has concluded that the market is doing fine."'
Before we move on to the next point, let us take this question one
step further and tie in the mandate-mapping exercise that we
described earlier. Recall that we endorsed Clark's model of isolating
problems for analysis within the groups that are experts on topics and
care the most about them. So on the surface, one might conclude that
the system is working right by taking a topic like "sending party pays"
and its progeny over to a study group to analyze it. However, sending
this economic discussion to a government-only or government-
48 Rohan Samarajiva, A Giant Step Backward or the Way Forward, LIRNEASIA (Sept.
2012), available at http://lirneasia.net/wp-content/uploads/2012/09/Samarajiva-WCIT-
Final_9.12.pdf (describing the problem as follows: "Even if content providers stop short of
total cutoff, they will be forced to pass along the added costs incurred through sending
party pays.").
49 Id. (Making the point that the sending-party-pays model would dis-incentivize creators
of free educational content used in the developing world).
5o WCIT-12 Final Acts, RESOLUTION PLEN/5, supra note 3.
51 See Rudolf Van der Berg, Internet traffic exchange: 2 billion users and it's done on a
handshake, OECD INSIGHTS (Oct. 22, 2012), available at
http://oeedinsights.org/20 12/10/22/lnternet-traffic-exchange- 2-billion-users- and-its-
done-on-a-handshake.
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dominated standard-setting process is the wrong place to go. By
analogy, it would be the equivalent of taking one's tax questions to an
architect rather than a certified public accountant or other tax expert.
To be sure, an architect is educated, licensed, and may even have a
personal opinion about taxes and money-and even how certain
construction techniques might be cheaper or result in tax rebates.
However, to state the obvious, architects build and design things,
while accountants deal with taxes and money. Taking an issue like
taxes and attempting to isolate it in a group that deals with
architecture is a misfit and risks producing an outcome that can
mislead policymakers. That is the case with sending the economic
modeling of the Internet over to ITU-T. They will issue an expert
opinion and may even hire economists to support them, but economic
modeling is not their core competence. It is not to say that the ITU
should not become involved in other areas of interest in some way, but
it should do so gingerly and respectfully, and create a sharp line when
legislating (e.g., through ITRs) in areas where they are outside of their
competence.
D. The Content and Social Layers
Much of the information that matters to people on the Internet
like email, blogs, videos and communications flow through the
Internet's content and social layers, and this is another key source of
tension in governance. This becomes particularly problematic when
governments conflate the content layer with the infrastructure or
logical layers. Two specific examples show how misplaced regulation
at the infrastructure or logical layers can really affect free expression
issues: spam and cybersecurity. To be sure, these examples are not as
easily categorized in any one or two layers. Nevertheless, analyzing
spam and cybersecurity through the lens of the layer model can be
instructive to policymakers.
1. Spain
Unsolicited bulk communications are clearly a matter that
pertains to the content layer: a message is determined to be both
"unsolicited" and a "communication" through some inspection of its
content. Unsolicited bulk communications also occur in the social
layer, where the speech and the speaker must be similarly reviewed,
and which gives the readers signals as to the identities of the senders
and the trust that's implicit in those identities. Intuitively, we know
that an email that we receive from a known business (e.g., pepsi.com,
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united.com or deloitte.com) is likely to be more trustworthy than the
same email sent from a consumer address (e.g., hotmail.com,
gmail.com or gmx.net.) Still, it is not possible to determine whether a
communication is "unsolicited" or not without analyzing or reading
the content of the message in some way. Context counts, and in some
cases it may be impossible to tell automatically if a message was
"unsolicited" based purely on its content or based purely on its origin.
To complicate matters further, in many countries certain kinds of
speech are protected even if they are not "solicited" per se.
Many technical solutions are available to address spam. For
example, automated detection of suspicious activities (i.e., recognizing
the "bulk" in "bulk communications") can occur on the logical layer.
Thus, if a botnet takes over a set of computers in a region and starts
sending messages of roughly the same size and origin, one might
conclude that a cyberattack is occurring.52 Automated systems are able
to recognize patterns, and computer systems can presumptively tag
bulk messages of similar size and scope as a botnet, a cyberattack, or
even just spam. Here's the rub: Even if bulk communications could be
presumptively signaled at the logical layer, it is impossible to
permanently separate the "bulk" from the rest of the stack without
overreaching. Automated spam folders do a fair job but in most all
cases, the spam goes to a separate folder that the user can still review
on their own.
The sending of any given message-singular or bulk-is a matter of
individual choice and implicates civil liberties and is not a matter for
governments to decide. For example, political campaigning is
protected speech in the United States, and in many countries
emergency communications are "pushed" through systems (email,
text, and phone). Even if not solicited, per se, such communications
are deemed valuable to the public and considered protected speech.53
Supporters of the ITR's anti-spain provisions often point to the first
section in the ITRs, which state that the regulations "do not address
52 See David D~cary-Htu and Benoit Dupont, The SocialNetwork of Hackers, GLOBAL
CRIME (July 28, 2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2119235 (describing botnets
and the complications of identifying their source and tracking the criminals).
53 Mark Sweet, Political E-Mail: Protected Speech or Unwelcome Span?, 1 DuKE L. &
TECH. REV. 1-9 (2003), available at http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/dltr/voll/issl/71
(analyzing the various forms of political spam and their protections under the First
Amendment).
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the content-related aspects of telecommunications."54 However, in
order for this argument to have merit, one would have to believe that
spam can be controlled at the logical layer only without regard for the
content. As noted above, we don't think that's possible.
Russia contributed one proposal regarding spam at WCIT-12 that
illustrates one influential-but dangerous-view on spam. In the
proposal, the Russians defined spam as:
information transmitted in bulk over
telecommunication networks as text, sound, image,
tangible data used in a man-machine interface bearing
indiscriminate advertising nature or having no
meaningful message, simultaneously or during a short
period of time, to a large number of particular
addresses without prior consent of the addressee
(recipient) to receive this information or information of
this nature.55
The choice of words here is important, as the proposal would have
defined spam as "information" that does not have a "meaningful
message." Leaving such determinations to governments (as the
Russian proposal would have done) would make those determinations
a clear-cut case of censorship.
In the end, the Russian provision was not included in the treaty.
Arguably the provision for "unsolicited bulk electronic
communications" does not have much effect because there is no
requirement for countries to act-the provision merely states that
"Member States should endeavor to take necessary measures to
prevent the propagation of unsolicited bulk electronic
communications."56 Even so, as we argued at the outset of this section,
failed provisions like these are certainly indications of what is to come
in the future of Internet policy. While the Russians failed to convince
the rest of the world that their definition of spam should become a
54 WCIT-12 Final Acts § 1.1, supra note 3; see also Eric Pfanner, Message, IfMurky,from
U.S. to the World, N.Y. TIMES, December 14, 2012, at Bi, available at
http://www.nytimes.Com/2o12/12/15/
technology/in-a-huff-a-telling-us-walkout.html?pagewanted=all&_r=o (describing how
confusing these provisions can be).
55 Document 47-E, § 2.13, supra note 31 (emphasis added).
56 WCIT-12 Final Acts § 5B, supra note 3.
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matter of international law, it is likely that autocratic governments
will continue to enforce this view on a national basis.
It is not the actual enforceability (or lack thereof) of the spam
provision that matters here. Indeed, very little-if anything-in the
provision is directly enforceable. However, inclusion of a spam
provision in the ITRs signals to the world that national governments
are permitted to impose content-related "anti-spam" measures of
their choosing.
Many have claimed that such concerns are irrelevant because
countries can cite "reservations" to any particular provision,
essentially refusing to accept its application into their national system.
This thinking is dangerous. Remember, the spam provision (as
adopted) is relatively toothless, so creating a reservation for it is
unlikely to make any legal difference. This issue is really a matter of
philosophy: the world either agrees or disagrees that government
inspection of messages is acceptable. The way we see it, this is a binary
matter.
2. Cybersecurity
Delegates in Dubai debated cybersecurity just as fervently as they
debated the spain provision. Many proposals that fall within the broad
ambit of security did not end up in the treaty, but many days and
nights were spent discussing requests from many countries for more
safety, security-and control-over the Internet. For example, Russia
and the Arab States insisted that regulators should know how all
Internet traffic is routed.57 Theoretically, knowledge of routing
patterns could lead to more control over cybercrime and to improved
cybersecurity measures.58 However, detail on how traffic is routed is
incompatible with the Internet's design because packets of
information on the Internet operate on dynamic route selection that
can change in matters of milliseconds depending on factors like
network congestion. 9
57 Document 47-E, § 3.3, supra note 31. (Proposing that "Operating agencies shall
determine by mutual agreement which international routes are to be used. A Member State
has the right to know the international route of its traffic, where technically feasible.").
58 See Alex Fitzpatrick, Why Internet Advocates Hate Russia's Proposal to Change the
Web, MASHABLE (Dec. 5, 2012), available at http://mashable.Com/2012/12/05/russia-
Internet-proposal.
59 See Paul Baran and the Origins of the Internet, THE RAND CORP., available at
http://www.rand.org/about/history/baran.html.
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Even though none of the proposed cybersecurity provisions in the
ITRs would have obligated the ITU to do anything (the obligations
would have been on member states rather than on the ITU as an
institution), there was much discussion about whether or not the ITU
itself is the appropriate forum for addressing cybersecurity matters. 60
Hamadoun Tour, for one, published an OpEd declaring summarily
that the proposed ITRs regulations would not affect free speech. 61 In
any case, as with the spam provision, the message from Russia and its
allies about the cybersecurity provision was clear: they do not feel that
existing multi-stakeholder groups are addressing their concerns.
Here, the Dubai-89 might have a point. Key multi-stakeholder
groups that handle cybersecurity and spam issues are essentially
absent in many regions, including in the developing world. Groups
like the Messaging Anti-Abuse Working Group (MAAWG), the Anti-
Phishing Working Group (APG), and the Coalition Against Unsolicited
Commercial Email (CAUCE) are much more active in the United
States and Europe but not well known in Africa, Latin America, and
Southeast Asia. This makes for good headlines of multi-stakeholder
solutions for malware in the United States and Europe, but that is not
the case elsewhere.62 In addition, the private sector has not done an
effective job of engaging policymakers, regulators, entrepreneurs and
civil society in these regions about best practices in spam and
cybersecurity-let alone any discussion of the consequences of
adjusting regulation "up the stack" to the content and social layers. In
the end, we believe that if the Dubai-55 wants to persuade the Dubai-
89 that the current multi-stakeholder system addresses these
concerns, then dedicated cybersecurity organizations like the ones
mentioned above need to conduct more active outreach, training, and
capacity-building efforts.
60 See Mike Masnick, Do We Really Want the UN in Charge of Cybersecurity Standards?,
TECHDIRT (Sept. 12, 2012), available at
http://www.techdirt.com/articles/2o12o91o/o2oo4o2o322/do-we-really-want-un-
charge-eybersecurity-standards.shtml.
61 Hamadoun Tour6, ITU meeting no threat tofree speech, CNN OPED (Dec. 5, 2012),
available at http://edition.enn.Com/2o12/12/05/business/toure-itu-weit-Internet-
connectivity.
6 2 See Mark Bowden, The Enemy Within, THE ATLANTIC (June 2010), available at
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2oo/o6/the-enemy-within/3o8o98/
(describing the story of the Conficker worm and efforts to control it).
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IV. ALIGNING THEORY AND PRACTICE
In this final section, we propose an approach that will facilitate the
governance of this immensely complex space. We believe a solid,
shared understanding of best practices for enhanced cooperation will
facilitate the efficacy of Internet governance. Kleinwiichter et al. have
proposed three levels of cooperative group involvement and
participation. 63 The first level is enhanced communication, which
proposes that "all stakeholders have the possibility to make their
arguments to all other stakeholders." Openness of communication in
terms of mailing lists and publicly accessible meetings satisfy this
condition. The second level, enhanced coordination, would involve
partners engaging more closely to produce a "conglomerate of
solutions," meaning that "stakeholders seek to divide challenges into
'thematic work packages' which are assigned to the appropriate
institution. Each institution then follows its logic to negotiate
mutually agreeable compromises/solutions." The third level of
cooperation, enhanced collaboration, would involve a set of
stakeholders developing a joint solution that necessitates the
installment of a new practice (and possibly a new institution)
supported by the cooperative group in question.
A. Strengthening the Internet Governance Forum
Internet governance challenges are debated in several forums. In
the current institutional ecosystem, we assert that the IGF is best
positioned to host deliberations about which actors should collaborate
in voluntary enhanced cooperation mode. The IGF was conceived in
2005 at the World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS), where
heads of state convened to discuss the Internet governance model. At
WSIS, the government participants were joined by members of the
private sector, academia and civil society to discuss the future of
global Internet policy, and the Summit concluded recognized that the
dialogue would require ongoing engagement.64
As the IGF enters its ninth year, it is also well suited to help
identify which institutions in the applicable layers of the Internet
63 WOLFGANG KLEINWACHTER, Multistakeholder Internet Governance: The Role of
Governments, in BENEDEK, BAUER, & KETrFEMANN, INTERNET GOVERNANCE AND THE
INFORMATION SOCIETY: GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES AND EUROPEAN DIMENSIONS (Eleven
International Publishing, 2oo8).
64 Tunis Agenda, supra note 8, at §§ 72-73.
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could address the issues relevant to those layers. Only the IGF's
mandate is broad enough and specific to Internet governance. As
previously stated, the IGF is not a decision-making body, and the fact
that it has no power by itself makes it the best institution for gathering
all relevant stakeholders. Stakeholder groups from every part of the
globe (government, industry, users, NGOs, and academia) attend
workshops, bi-laterals, coalitions and other events and play an active
role in the IGF. It is an environment where controversial issues can be
addressed in a constructive manner with all parties at the table, and
without the posturing and negotiations that can happen when there is
a decision at stake, such as in a regulatory proceeding.
Importantly, open discussions between diverse experts result in an
atmosphere of listening and learning. The IGF is built for everyone
who cares about the Internet; there's no limitation on who can join
and take the microphone, including executives of leading companies
to civil rights activists, and even youth that use the Internet for
learning and entertainment. Possibly the strongest case for the IGF is
that it allows all stakeholders (including those from developing
countries) to confer and build relationships with peers in other
countries and actively participate in working groups and projects that
extend beyond the IGF itself.
We do not mean to oversell the IGF, but it is undeniably the only
truly multi-stakeholder forum that convenes so many diverse
influencers on a regular basis. Many stakeholders do not want the IGF
to become a decision-making body, and a change of the IGF's mission
to convert it to a decision-making body would be inconsistent with the
mandate set forth at WSIS. However, the IGF need not remain static.
One way to improve the IGF would be to identify which other forums
and institutions can be used to resolve various issues raised at the
IGF. This could be seen as a kind of "policy intelligence transfer" (or
"policy tech transfer"). Workshops could be designated for developing
non-binding suggestions to address certain Internet governance
issues. For example, security issues of a technical nature might be
recommended for action at the IETF or even organizations like FIRST
or the IEEE.6' As an outcome of each of the workshops, the panelists
and participants record their recommendations for next steps to
address each particular issue in their country or region.
Additionally, the IGF needs financial resources so that it can work
more effectively as a platform for other groups. The IGF works on a
shoestring budget of less than $1m per year and has only one full-time
65 Full names of the abbreviated institutions, as well as the core of their mandates, can be
found in the Appendix.
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employee.66 When compared to the budget of the ITU-which is more
than $15om per year-it is clear that there are opportunities for
participants to increase their financial contributions to the IGF so as
to set it up for a stronger future."
The emergence of many "regional" IGFs is also a very positive
thing where many policy issues are discussed prior to the IGF itself.
Future work on the IGF's website, for example, could take these
regional IGFs into account, and, if possible, provide a central
repository for reports, videos, and other information. This shared
database would serve regional IGFs, and it could also feed in to the
main IGF each year. This does not mean that the regional IGFs need
to follow the same themes as the IGF, but the IGF website could be
used to create better opportunities for sharing information with the
IGF's wider global audience. We're hopeful that a working group will
be established within the IGF to develop ideas like this and act on
them.
B. More on IGF Funding
As we have stated above, the IGF is one of the best fora for
Internet governance deliberations, so strengthening it in the ways
suggested above will only increase its ability to function as an
organization that truly acknowledges and addresses the needs of all
stakeholder groups. The multi-stakeholder system enables the free
flow of information and facilitates free discussion among
stakeholders-but these activities are not cost free and the community
will need to find a way to fund the IGF and similar activities in ways
that can enable them to engage on equal footing with well-funded
organizations like the ITU. Although we are not advocating any sort of
a "de-funding" campaign for the ITU, it is noteworthy that the ITU's
two top funders are the United States and Japan, each of which
contributes nearly $11 million annually.68 By contrast, the USA has
funded the IGF only for the first time in 2013, and Japan has not
66 IGFFunding, IGF WEBSITE, available at http://www.intgovforum.org/ems/fundin
67 Financial Planfor the years 2012-2015, ITU NEWS, No. 9 (20o), available at
https://itunews.itu.int/En/985-Financial-Plan-for-the-years-20122015-.note.aspx.
6 8 Battle lines being drawn for the next ITU conference, INFO SECURITY (Jan. 17, 2013),
available at http://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/view/30283/battle-lines-being-
drawn-for-the-next-itu-conference.
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contributed any funding IGF in the past two years. We do not intend
to single out the USA or Japan except to highlight that the mindset of
all major governmental actors here needs to change-particularly if
the Dubai-55 countries truly hope to defend the benefits of a multi-
stakeholder system. In this particular context, it is noteworthy that we
are suggesting more government intervention (and in particular, the
exchequer), whereas in other contexts like the ITU, we're making a
case for less of a government chokehold. In the end, it is striking the
balance that matters the most.
C. Next steps for the IGF
Internet governance must become a transnational and multi-
stakeholder effort. We assess and promote the IGF as the deliberation
forum best situated to enable all stakeholders to add topics to the
agenda, deliberate on those topics, and identify the best way to resolve
issues. Internet enabled innovation will continue to develop at a very
fast pace and all stakeholders and institutions must be both adaptive
and willing to engage in order to seek the balance between interests.
The case for government participation in Internet governance is
clear: governments have been regulating operations within their
borders for centuries. The harder case is to convince the private sector
and civil society that it is important to actively and persistently engage
in governance matters. If the Internet users of the world wish to rely
solely on their governments to set the rules, we are likely to see
increased efforts to control the Internet through blunt instruments
like the international treaty effort in Dubai.
Finally, governance development by way of any institution, and
particularly the IGF, needs well-defined processes. These processes
need not be static or inflexible, but they should be predictable. While
the non-decision making nature should stay at the heart of its mission,
the IGF can complement its role as core deliberation platform, by
establishing solid methods to document and archive the development
of Internet policy and governance themes, as well as by allowing
voluntary enhanced cooperation to form and tackle the challenges
identified. In many respects, the IGF has the potential to develop into
an institution that can do much more than it does today. However, the
authors also believe that a deeper analysis into the way that the IGF is
overseen-and the extent to which that oversight involves other
stakeholders-is a matter for further analysis. For example, while the
69 See IGF Website, supra note 66.
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IGF is multistakeholder in the way that it develops the annual
program, it is not clear that there is any multistakeholder engagement
in the oversight of the IGF itself. We leave this discussion for another
day.
V. CONCLUSION
The Internet is a global resource, and policies that are
implemented to manage the Internet on a global basis affect its utility
for all. Nations are continuously attempting to seize control of the
Internet by grafting their domestic policies onto the global resource.
This temptation continues the bankrupt theory that the Westphalian
system in the physical world can also apply across the global Internet.
However, in today's highly connected global environment, it is
increasingly impossible to impose local or regional rules on the
Internet. For these reasons, there is a compelling case to constantly
seek agreement on transnational principles for governance, even if
permanent solutions are never reached. As innovation occurs so
rapidly, there is considerable value in discussing and embracing the
"tussle" so that stakeholders can understand each others' perspectives
and work towards compromises. In some ways, it is the tussle that
matters the most-and the willingness of the stakeholders to engage
with each other and attempt to work out the policy equivalent of
"rough consensus and running code." In other words, it is important
to work towards practical, working systems that can be quickly
implemented, adjusted, and updated rather than, as Voltaire famously
described, to let perfect be the enemy of good. The governance process
itself and the diversity of actors within it may be more important than
the outcomes, communiqu6s, positions and other efforts to resolve
disputes. Speaking from our experience as representatives of Google
at these events, the authors can attest to the discussions that happen
back in the company offices. We are often in positions where we
recognize that engagement and compromise on our side can be much
better than dealing with a unilateral law-even if the compromise
provides less-than-satisfying commercial or philosophical gains.
As the globe looks toward governance systems for the Internet in
the next phase, we should avoid the temptation to enshrine arcane
rules in international treaties. Although treaties that relate to Internet
governance can set norms across international boundaries, in the
process of setting such norms, there is a risk of enacting rules that
increase censorship and provide more opportunities for centralized
control of the Internet. Doing so has great risk of slowing the
innovation and benefits that the Internet has brought so far.
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Instead of seeking "control" of the Internet through treaties, it
follows from the analysis put forward in this Paper that countries
should focus on improving the existing institutions that have
developed the policies for the Internet so far and to encourage these
organizations to continue to develop and deepen their competencies
in their respective domains. Improving the existing institutions and
organizations is really hard work, and it might be tempting to throw it
all away and start anew, but there is no evidence that new, untested
approaches could bring the same kind of enormous value that the
current institutions have brought so far. Moreover, since the same
players would be debating the form of new institutions, the results
might be similar.
The list is long of things to be improved, and it includes working
with the IETF for areas like the Internet's technical standards, ICANN
for naming and, with the Regional Internet Registries, for addressing
policies and to continue to increase global inclusion in that decision
making, and the ITU as a place for access infrastructure that is so
critical, particularly in emerging markets that do not yet have it. For
the inevitable tussle that will always exist between regions,
stakeholders and values, the IGF is an umbrella that can bring
together stakeholders from all communities to debate the policies for
the future. All of these organizations need to be nimble and ongoing
reform is required as the Internet evolves. However, we should turn to
these organizations and push them to improve their effectiveness in
their respective roles rather than creating new overarching treaties or
mandates.
The experience at the WCIT in Dubai demonstrated the folly of
regulation solely by treaty. In Dubai, representatives from around the
globe attempted to lock down rules in a two-week period that saw
some really unfortunate alignments: who would have imagined that
Arab States, Russia, Africa, and Latin America would unite to sign the
treaty (the Dubai-89), with the United States, Canada, and Europe
refusing to sign the treaty (the Dubai-55). There were some defectors
in each of these groups (e.g., Costa Rica, Peru, Chile, Ecuador and
Kenya went with the Dubai-55, while otherwise close allies like
Mexico, Argentina, Brazil, and South Africa went with the Dubai-89).
Over time, it may be possible to understand the motivations behind
these alignments. However, the fact remains that the delegates in
Dubai did not know until the very last hours of the conference who
would be signing and who would not, which is evidence that
negotiations of this kind may lead to outcomes that are unpredictable,
and this is not a good outcome when rules are enshrined in
international law. At the core, we have looked at some of the examples
from the divide between the Dubai-55 and Dubai-89, and we suggest
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that the following six topics will reappear in the future and are
important to address in the coming months:
1. Domain Name and Addressing policy should stay
exclusively with ICANN and the RIRs, backed by the
technical standards of the IETF. Many countries do not
feel that they have enough say in the current domain-
naming system and seek making this a government
function. Still, the best multi-stakeholder approach
would be to have these concerns heard within ICANN
and addressed there-fought, debated, argued and
pressed. The Government Advisory Committee role
could be strengthened in aid of this outcome. In order
to better show its ability to address these issues,
ICANN should continue to expand its presence outside
the United States and become more global.
2. The ITU's strength is infrastructure, not Internet
standards. In the years of the telegraph, telephone and
fax, the ITU was instrumental in enabling
interconnectivity and interoperability. However, in the
Internet, the IETF has proven that it efficiently
develops open standards for interconnectivity and
interoperability. The role of the ITU today is more on
infrastructure and less on standards, otherwise the
group within the ITU that sets standards, ITU-T, will
continue to see itself tackling things that are way out of
its mandate and expertise, such as what happened at
the WCIT, when the ITU-T was charged with
responsibility for developing the next phase of the
response to the "sending party pays" proposal,
something that would fundamentally alter the
economic model of the Internet. Such matters are best
left to economic organizations like the OECD.
3. The content and social layers are not in any remit for
new treaties; we should work on improving those
existing treaties while leaving deliberation and "policy
tech transfer" to the IGF. One of the most contentious
areas of policy in the Internet is how to handle the
information that flows across it. International
organizations like UNESCO, UNHCR, and the Council
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of Europe have established themselves as protectors of
free expression in treaty instruments and reform
should continue there. Many countries seek to have an
influence regarding what information is acceptable for
a variety of reasons, and the tussle and debate can
continue in those existing fora, while allowing
deliberation at the IGF, which is uniquely positioned
for the discussion since the IGF will not enact new rules
itself, but can inform the participants in the other fora.
In Dubai, we saw free-expression interests clash starkly
in the proposals for cybersecurity and spam. Although
the final provisions of the treaty removed most of the
sting, the effort to control content is likely to continue,
as will the drive to create new treaties and rules, which
will lead to more uncertainty in international conflict-
of-laws than it is likely to resolve. Again, this is why it is
important for non-decisional fora like the IGF to
flourish, since policymakers can meet with
stakeholders to meet and discuss policies to
accommodate each others' interests without risk of
each event turning into a new set of rules that lawyers
then need to figure out how to implement.
4. The IGF needs to continue to evolve. There is a lot of
opportunity for the IGF to improve. For starters, as we
have stated many times, the IGF should not become a
decision-making body because exploratory discussion,
together with honest and constructive deliberation
would be swamped with positioning and negotiations.
However, the IGF need not remain static. Along these
lines, the IGF could be viewed as a policy-based "tech
transfer instrument," a "policy lab" of sorts, for
example, by including recommendations at the
conclusion of certain key workshops to refer topics to
areas of competency within the multi-stakeholder
governance system. Subsequent meetings of the IGF
could track the progress of these exported issues.
5. Stakeholders must realize that Internet governance is
not free. Organizations like the IGF are acutely
underfunded and governments and stakeholders
around the globe need to step up and pay their share.
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Multi-stakeholder governance has brought us the
Internet's innovation so far, but there is a strong
imbalance between the perception of how to fund the
policy development and the actual fact of funding. For
example, there are many countries that contribute
highly to the ITU but provide no funding to the IGF.
We believe that national and private sector
stakeholders who engage in and benefit from the IGF
discussions should provide financial support to assure
its continued operation.
6. All organizations should map their view of their role
in the ecosystem. As Professor George E.P. Box
famously said, "essentially, all models are wrong, but
some are useful."7 We believe that it is a useful
exercise for organizations to run through the diligence
of presenting their view of how they fit within the
ecosystem. This proposal was made in November 2013
to a Strategy Panel at ICANN, and the Panel produced a
view together with several observations about the
stakeholders that ICANN collaborates with in within
the Ecosystem. Drawing on this analysis, the Panel
concluded that further opportunities are available to
establish the "web of affirmations of commitments"
between ICANN and other collaborators.7 If other key
stewards, like ICANN, are able to present their view of
how they fit within the governance ecosystem, these
views can be aggregated and analyzed from a broader
perspective and holes within certain fields of coverage
can be identified.
In the end, we may never manage to separate issues into neat and
clear, distinguishable "tussle" spaces and different stakeholders may
never agree. However, permanent tensions exist in any functioning
system and it is perfectly acceptable-and good-for some of these
disagreements to exist, even in perpetuity. However, the Internet
70 GEORGE E.P. Box & N.R. DRAPER, EMPIRICAL MODEL BUILDING AND RESPONSE SURFACES
424 (John Wiley & Sons, 1987).
71 See generally VINTON G. CERF ET AL., STRATEGY REPORT: ICANN's ROLE IN THE INTERNET
GOVERNANCE ECOSYSTEM (2014), available at http://goo.gl/9WroCD.
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policy system should endeavor to mirror the dynamic and rapidly
changing nature of the Internet itself. As Clark et al. pointed out, the
Internet's technical design allows for logical separation of functions
outside of the technical space, and separating matters in a reasonable
way might well be the most important challenge for (transnational)
policymaking. We do not want to imply that anything should be static,
but it will be important for each organization to understand its place
within the Internet's "stack" and to work well to address global
concerns within their stack and their primary area(s) of competency.
If done properly, this process should avoid further moves for
wholesale takeover of single international agencies into the entire
stack.
The complex challenges of governing the Internet as well as the
aspiration to maximize the Internet's utility for all humankind allows
only one conclusion: the Internet is our shared responsibility.
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APPENDIX - INTERNET GOVERNANCE ECOSYSTEM
INSTITUTIONS & MANDATES
The following table lists a selection of relevant institutions in the
Internet governance ecosystem as listed in Illustration 2. The list is by
no means comprehensive, but we hope to have included the most
significant institutions as well as suitable examples for all three
categories.
United Nations Agencies are the traditional fora for international
diplomatic activities including the negotiation of treaties and policies.
For the most part these institutions are based on inter-governmental
practices with only peripheral consultations with civil society and the
private sector. Over the last decades several process have been opened
up and next to the developments in Internet governance other fields,
e.g. in the political discourse and cooperative activities against global
warming are developing successful multi-stakeholder governance
approaches.
The "native" Internet Governance institutions have naturally all
been founded in the last 25 years and have either an academic or
engineering origin. Given the success of the network and the speed of
development and innovation the institutions have followed an open
(multi-stakeholder) approach to participation (everybody who is
interested can participate) as well as a cooperative ground swell
regarding decision making practices (running code and rough
consensus).
As described in section 2 many professions and media
technologies conflate on the Internet. The professional associations of
these traditional actors (e.g. journalists) as well as native online
professions (e.g. service providers in GNI) are also important voices in
the discourse and sources of self regulation and moral practices (i.e.
professional codes of conduct).
Name Mandate or Mission
ISOC - Internet to promote the open development, evolution,
Society and use of the Internet for the benefit of all
people throughout the world.
http://www.Internetsociety.org/who-we-
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Mandate or Mission
are/mission
IETF - Internet
Engineering Task
Force
IAB - Internet
Architecture
Board
"make the Internet work better by producing
high quality, relevant technical documents that
influence the way people design, use, and
manage the Internet."
http://www.ietf.org/about/mission.html
"architectural oversight of IETF activities,
Internet Standards Process oversight and
appeal, and the appointment of the RFC Editor."
http://www.iab.org/about/
ICANN - Internet
Corporation for
Assigned Names
and Numbers
"coordinate, at the overall level, the global
Internet's systems of unique identifiers, and in
particular to ensure the stable and secure
operation of the Internet's unique identifier
systems."
http://www.icann.org/en/about/governance/byl
aws#I
W3C - World "lead the World Wide Web to its full potential by
Wide Web developing protocols and guidelines that ensure
Consortium the long-term growth of the Web."
ITU
International
Telecommunicati
on Union
IEEE - Institute
of Electrical and
Electronics
Engineers
http://www.w3.org/Consortium/mission
"allocate global radio spectrum and satellite
orbits, develop the technical standards that
ensure networks and technologies seamlessly
interconnect, and strive to improve access to
ICTs to underserved communities worldwide."
http://www.itu.int/en/about/Pages/default. asp
x
"foster technological innovation and excellence
for the benefit of humanity."
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Mandate or Mission
http://www.ieee.org/about/vision-mission.htm
1
ISO - "develop International Standards."
International
Organization for http://www.iso.org/iso/home/about.htm
Standardization
WPFC - World Defense and promotion of press freedom in all
Press Freedom media.
Committee
GNI -
Network
Initiative
http ://www.wpfc.org/?q=node/2
Global help ICT companies "navigate face pressure by
governments to act in ways that may impact the
fundamental human rights of privacy and
freedom of expression."
http://www.globalnetworkinitiative.org/about/i
ndex.php
WBU - World
Broadcasting
Union
WEF - World
Economic Forum
"coordinating body for broadcasting unions who
represent broadcaster networks across the
globe."
http://www.worldbroadeastingunions.org/wbua
rea/about/about. asp
"promote policies that will improve the
economic and social well-being of people around
the world."
http://www.oecd.org/about/
OECD
Organisation for
Economic
Co-operation and
Development
"promote policies that will improve the
economic and social well-being of people around
the world."
http://www.oecd.org/about/
IGF - Internet "convening a new forum for multi-stakeholder
Governance policy dialogue"
Name
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Name
Forum
Mandate or Mission
http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/aboutigf
WIPO - World "promote innovation and creativity for the
Intellectual economic, social and cultural development of all
Property countries, through a balanced and effective
Organisation international intellectual property system."
http ://www.wipo.int/about-wipo/en/
WTO - World "provides a forum for negotiating agreements
Trade aimed at reducing obstacles to international
Organisation trade and ensuring a level playing field for all,
thus contributing to economic growth and
development."
UNESCO
United Nation
Education,
Science and
Culture
Organisation
UNHRC - United
Nations Human
Rights Council
FAO - Food and
Agricultural
Organisation
http://wto.org/english/thewto-e/whatis-e/wto
dg stat e.htm
"create the conditions for dialogue among
civilizations, cultures and peoples, based upon
respect for commonly shared values. "
http://www.unesco.org/new/en/unesco/about-
us/who-we-are/introducing-unesco/
"strengthening the promotion and protection of
human rights around the globe and for
addressing situations of human rights violations
and make recommendations on them."
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/Pag
es/AboutCouncil.aspx
"improve nutrition, increase agricultural
productivity, raise the standard of living in rural
populations and contribute to global economic
growth."
http://www.fao.org/about/en/
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